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ABSTRACT
This paper argues that the European Union should not, as it
currently proposes, extend the term of protection for sound
recordings in Europe. It compares the U.K. government’s current
policy that the scope and length of copyright protection for sound
recordings should not be extended, with that of the European
Union which, encouraged by the French government particularly,
has recently proposed an extension from the fifty-year term to a
ninety-five-year term of copyright protection for sound recordings.
It analyzes several major independent reviews of the evidence on
extending copyright protection for sound recordings, including the
findings and recommendations of the December 2006 Gowers
Review of Intellectual Property, an independent study
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commissioned by the U.K government, the University of
Amsterdam Institute for Information Law report for the European
Commission on the harmonization of copyright and related rights
protections in Europe, and subsequent government consultation
and strategy documents on proposed changes to U.K. law. It also
reviews the positions taken by other stakeholders, including the
music industry, academics and the media, in this debate, and
analyzes the likely direction of the law in Europe.
INTRODUCTION
Ian Anderson of Jethro Tull is apparently “horrified that, along
with countless other great artists and bands of the 60’s and 70’s,
Jethro Tull’s earliest recordings will progressively fall out of
copyright in the foreseeable future under current U.K.
legislation.”1 French President Nicholas Sarkozy is reportedly
similarly concerned about royalties on behalf of all Europe’s aging
rock stars, and wants the European Union to extend the fifty-year
period for which copyright in sound recordings and performers’
rights are protected in Europe.2
In arguing to increase the term of copyright protection, Ian
Anderson has historical precedent on his side; successive copyright
acts have steadily expanded the subject matter covered by
copyright and related rights, and increased the term of protection,
from a fourteen year renewable term in the first British copyright
act of 1709,3 up to 120 years for some works made for hire under
U.S. law today.4 However, in 2007 the British Government

A PDF version of this Article is available online at http://law.fordham.edu/publications/
article.ihtml?pubID=200&id=3025. Visit http://www.iplj.net for access to the complete
Journal archive.
*
Assistant Professor of Business Law, The College of New Jersey.
1
Ian Anderson, Anderson Speaks Out on Recorded Copyright Law in the U.K.,
JETHRO TULL: THE OFFICIAL WEBSITE, Jan. 1, 2006, http://www.j-tull.com/news/
UKcopyrightlaw.cfm.
2
Charles Bremner, Nicholas Sarkozy’s Gold Retirement for Rock Dinosaurs, TIMES
ONLINE, Feb. 1, 2008, http://entertainment.timesonline.co.uk/tol/arts_and_entertainment/
music/article3285729.ece.
3
Statute of Anne, 1710, 8 Ann., c. 19 (Eng.).
4
17 U.S.C. § 302(c) (2006).
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rejected the idea of a further extension of protection for sound
recordings and performers’ rights,5 after a review of the British
Intellectual Property system by former Financial Times editor
Andrew Gowers,6 found that the copyright system was already
stacked strongly in favor of copyright holders,7 and recommended
against any extension, and also recommended that U.K. law in the
future adopt the principle of not retrospectively extending IP
rights.8
This paper compares the U.K. government’s current policy that
the scope and length of copyright protection for sound recordings
should not be extended, with that of the European Union which,
encouraged by the French government particularly,9 has recently
proposed a 95-year term of copyright protection for sound
recordings.10 It focuses on the findings and recommendations
made by the December 2006 Gowers Review of Intellectual
Property commissioned by the U.K. government,11 the University
of Amsterdam Institute for Information Law report for the E.U. on
copyright and related rights12 (“IViR Report”), and the subsequent

5

HM TREASURY PRE-BUDGET REPORT, INVESTING IN BRITAIN’S POTENTIAL: BUILDING
OUR LONG-TERM FUTURE, 2006, Cm. 6984, at 65, available at http://www.officialdocuments.gov.uk/document/cm69/6984/6984.asp [hereinafter PRE-BUDGET REPORT].
6
A short profile of Andrew Gowers is available at HM Treasury’s website. Andrew
Gowers, Biography, http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/gowersreview_biography.htm (last
visited Mar. 12, 2009).
7
ANDREW GOWERS, GOWERS REVIEW OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 50 (2006),
available at http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/d/pbr06_gowers_report_755.pdf (“Economic
evidence indicates that the length of protection for copyright works already far exceeds
the incentives required to invest in new works.”).
8
Id. at 6.
9
See Bremner, supra note 2.
10
Press Release, European Commission, “Performing Artists—No Longer Be the
‘Poor Cousins’ of the Music Business”—Charlie McCreevy (Feb. 14, 2008), available at
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/08/240
[hereinafter
Performing Artists].
11
See GOWERS, supra note 7, at 1.
12
BERNT HUGENHOLZ ET AL., THE RECASTING OF COPYRIGHT AND RELATED RIGHTS FOR
THE KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY (2006), available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/
copyright/docs/studies/etd2005imd195recast_report_2006.pdf [hereinafter IVIR REPORT].
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U.K. government consultation and strategy document on U.K.
proposed changes to copyright protections.13
The paper details the opposing views on extending the duration
of protection of stakeholders within Europe, and analyzes the
likely direction of the law in Europe, and the effect of the E.U.
approach on the duration of copyright protection, to the ongoing
global debate on the ideal balance and optimum duration for
copyright and related rights in a digital age. The paper uses the
term “related rights” commonly used in E.U. law for rights akin to
copyright, such as recording or performers’ rights, rather than the
term “neighboring rights,” more often employed under U.K. law
for such rights.
Part I of the paper consists of a discussion of the purpose and
policy behind copyright protection and the development of
copyright laws in the common law and civil law traditions,
including details of copyright and related rights protections in the
United Kingdom and United States and the effect of current E.U.
directives on U.K. law. Part II sets out the major challenge to the
copyright system created by the revolution in digital technology
and reviews the positions taken so far by the opposing sides in the
debate over how copyright law should react to digitization and
globalization. Part III concentrates on the empirical findings and
recommendations of the Gowers Review, and other U.K.
government actions, in response to the question of how to adapt
U.K. copyright laws to a global and technological world, while
Part IV assesses the IViR Report and proposals at the European
level on the same issue. Finally, Part V considers the likely
direction of E.U. law and develops the argument that there are no
good reasons to increase the term of protection for related rights
and the E.U. should seriously reconsider its proposal to do so and
should not listen exclusively to the music industry in this debate.

13

U.K. INTELLECTUAL PROP. OFFICE, TAKING FORWARD THE GOWERS REVIEW OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROPOSED CHANGES TO COPYRIGHT EXCEPTIONS (Jan. 2008),
available at http://www.ipo.gov.uk/consult-copyrightexceptions.pdf.
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I. PURPOSE AND POLICY OF COPYRIGHT LAW
The Gowers Review stated that Intellectual Property law serves
three principal functions: “to incentivise knowledge (and hence
wealth) creation; to accumulate knowledge in a culture; and to
protect a distinctive identity.”14 According to Gowers, the
purposes of copyright protection are both to provide incentives to
create knowledge, while also enabling knowledge to become
publicly available. “[W]ithout protection there would be no
economic incentive to fund innovation or creativity.”15 Gowers
recognized that copyright involves a balance between making
knowledge publicly available to all, and providing economic
incentives to those who create it, and that the main rationale for
copyright protection, at least in the Anglo-American tradition, is
the economic, utilitarian rationale.16 However, in the Review’s
mention of protecting a “distinctive identity,” Gowers also seemed
to acknowledge another rationale of copyright law, that of
protecting the property rights of the creator, a theory more often
linked to civil law systems.17
A. Utilitarian Theory
The dominant theory of copyright protection in the AngloAmerican tradition is utilitarianism, where the economic incentives
provided to authors by the monopoly-type protection of copyright
law must be balanced by the requirement that the protected
expression is not given absolute, nor indefinite, protection from all
non-permitted use.18 Most importantly, protected work should
eventually fall into the public domain, so that it can become
accessible for the benefit of future innovators and creators.19 “The
principle justification for intellectual property (IP) laws in the
14

GOWERS, supra note 7, at 11.
Id. at 12.
16
See id.
17
See, e.g., LIOR ZEMER, THE IDEA OF AUTHORSHIP IN COPYRIGHT 37 n.55 (2007) (“It
is often claimed that . . . continental copyright law w[as] inspired by . . . authors’ natural
rights.”); Jane Ginsburg, A Tale of Two Copyrights: Literary Property in Revolutionary
France and America, 64 TUL. L. REV. 991, 991 (1990) (“French copyright law is said to
enshrine the author.”); GOWERS, supra note 7, at 15.
18
See ZEMER, supra note 17, at 9–13.
19
See id at 12.
15
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Anglo-American tradition is economic.”20 Although a variety of
commentators have at various times favored perpetual copyright
protection,21 a perpetual property right for authors does not fit
comfortably within this utilitarian, economic bargain that balances
the rights of the public and authors.
B. Personhood and Other Alternative Theories
There are several theories other than utilitarianism that have
been used to explain intellectual property protection. According to
Lior Zemer, “[s]ix major approaches dominate the literature . . . the
instrumental/utilitarian approach; the labour theory of property; the
personhood theory; social-institutional-planning; traditional
proprietarianism; and authorial constructionism.”22 The main
characteristics of the non-utilitarian theories of copyright
protection is that they are focused more on the allocation of
property rights to the author (whether in the fruits of his labor, or
the creations of his personality or authorship) than in providing a
balance between encouraging the author to create, and promoting
public knowledge.23
Copyright protection in France and other countries of
Continental Europe evolved from the theory of personality rights.24
The rationale for copyright protection under this theory is that “the
allocation of entitlements and control over resources in the external
environment, in the guise of property, is necessary for the
development of personality.”25 As a result, since its inception,
French copyright law has used the life of the author as a starting
point for calculating the duration of the copyright term, and, in
addition to economic rights, provided protection for the author’s

20

Pamela Samuelson, Should Economics Play a Role in Copyright Law and Policy?, 1
U. OTTAWA L. & TECH. J. 3, 3 (2004).
21
See SIVA VAIDHYANATHAN, COPYRIGHT AND COPYWRONGS 71 (2001); see also Mark
Helprin, Op-Ed., A Great Idea Lives Forever. Shouldn’t Its Copyright?, N.Y. TIMES, May
20, 2007, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/20/opinion/20helprin.html.
22
See ZEMER, supra note 17, at 9.
23
See id. at 13–21.
24
Id. at 16; see also Ginsburg, supra note 17, at 996.
25
See ZEMER, supra note 17, at 16.
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inalienable, natural rights, so-called “moral rights.”26 Moral rights
derive from the conception that the work is part of the author’s
personality,27 but have not received statutory protection in the U.K.
tradition until fairly recently.28
It is theoretically easier, under these author-centered
conceptions of the purpose of copyright, to justify perpetual
copyright protection because authors’ rights are paramount,29
while, on the other hand, also limiting the duration of protection
afforded to performers, on the basis that they are not creators on a
par with authors, but merely reproducers of already created work,
and thus deserve a more limited duration of protection.30 The
influence of the European “personhood” or “labor-based
justification” can be seen in the Berne Convention; its inclusion of
moral rights,31 the calculation of the term of copyright based on the
lifetime of the author of the work,32 and the fact that it does not
protect the related rights of reproducers such as sound recordings
and performers’ rights which did not received international
recognition and protection until much later.33
26

Moral rights are defined as “the right to claim authorship of the work and to object
to any distortion, mutilation, or other modification of, or other derogatory action in
relation to, the said work, which would be prejudicial to his honor or reputation.” Berne
Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works art. 6bis, Sept. 9, 1886,
revised July 24, 1971, amended Sept. 29, 1979, 828 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter Berne
Convention].
27
See ZEMER, supra note 17, at 51.
28
Copyright Designs and Patents Act, 1988, c. 48, §§ 77–89 (Eng.).
29
See, e.g., VAIDHYANATHAN, supra note 21, at 71–72 (discussing Samuel Clemens’
preference for perpetual copyright for authors based on moral rather than economic
rationales). Although Samuel Clemens (Mark Twain), among others, favored perpetual
copyright, it does not fit philosophically with the “limited times” economic rationale of
Anglo-American law.
30
See Ruth Towse, The Singer or the Song? Developments in Performers’ Rights from
the Perspective of a Cultural Economist, 3 REV. L. & ECON. 745, 748 (2007), available at
http://www.bepress.com/rle/vol3/iss3/art6 (“Composers, however, were always
vulnerable to unauthorized copying of their works whereas performers were not until
relatively recently.”). Thus, performers did not need as much protection.
31
Berne Convention, supra note 26.
32
Id. art. 7.
33
International Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of Phonograms
and Broadcasting Organizations, Oct. 26, 1961, 496 U.N.T.S. 43 [hereinafter Rome
Convention] was the first international recognition for rights in sound recordings. The
United States is not a party to this convention.
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C. Harmonization of Copyright Law
By the beginning of the twenty-first century, copyright and
related rights laws have been partially harmonized by a large
number of international treaties starting with the Berne
Convention, and followed later by the Rome Convention, the
Universal Copyright Convention, Agreement on the Trade Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights and the World Intellectual
Property Organization: Performances and Phonograms Treaty.34 It
matters little now whether a signatory countries’ law was based
originally on the Anglo-American tradition of the economic
utilitarian bargain, or the Continental labor-based property
ownership theory. It must now provide minimum protection based
on these international treaties for various copyright and related
rights.35 Copyright must be protected for the life of the author plus
fifty years under Berne,36 and sound recordings and performers’
rights are required to be protected for a lesser period, ranging from
a minimum of twenty years, in the case of the Rome Convention,37
to fifty years under the WIPO Treaty and TRIPs Agreement.38
This reflects the continued conception of performers’ and
phonographic rights as economic rights rather than personalitybased rights.
No international treaty requires these related rights to be
protected for anything approaching the term of ninety-five years
(or life plus seventy years) for which they are now protected under

34

See supra notes 32 and 33 for the Berne and Rome Conventions respectively. Other
intellectual property conventions include the Universal Copyright Convention, July 24,
1971, 25 U.S.T. 1341, 943 U.N.T.S. 178 [hereinafter Universal Copyright Convention];
Agreement on the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994;
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 108 Stat.
4809, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299 [hereinafter TRIPs Agreement]; and World Intellectual
Property Organization Performances and Phonograms Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, 36 I.L.M.
76 (1997) [hereinafter WIPO Treaty].
35
Ginsburg argues in A Tale of Two Copyrights: Literary Property in Revolutionary
France and America, supra note 17, at 994, that the differences between the U.S. and
French copyright systems were, even at their inception, not as extensive as typically
described.
36
See Berne Convention, supra note 26, art. 7.
37
See Rome Convention, supra note 33, art. 14.
38
See TRIPs Agreement art. 12 and WIPO Treaty art. 17, supra note 34.
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U.S. law39 or for which it is currently proposed to protect them in
Europe.40 The current main difference in the duration of copyright
and related rights worldwide is this difference in the protection of
related rights in Europe and in the U.S.
D. Copyright Protection Under U.K. Law
1. Statute of Anne
Modern copyright protection in the Anglo-American tradition
is generally traced back to the Statute of Anne which provided a
copyright term of fourteen years for books and maps.41 In fact, the
Statute of Anne followed from the abolition of the printing
monopoly provided by over 150 years of various Licensing Acts to
the Stationers’ Company, the guild of London printers.42
After the stationers lost their monopoly on book publication,
and censorship in 1695, chaos reigned in the newly deregulated
publishing industry which the printers, used to their monopoly,
were not equipped to meet, and they realized that they had to
include authors in their struggle to impose some order and get back
some legal control over the industry.43 The resulting compromise
was the Statute of Anne, “an elaborate attempt to regulate
publishers, a way to balance the interests of the bookprinting
industry with the concerns that monopolies were growing too
powerful in England.”44
Under the Statute of Anne, copyright protection was initially
awarded to the author, who could register to receive a term of
protection for fourteen years, renewable for another fourteen
years,45 but it was always recognized that “[a] manuscript is worth
39

17 U.S.C. § 302(c) (2006).
See Performing Artists, supra note 10.
41
Statute of Anne, 1710, 8 Ann., c. 19 (Eng.).
42
See VAIDHYANATHAN, supra note 21, at 39–40.
43
See id. for details of the stationers’ efforts to regain legal control of the book
publishing industry.
44
Id. at 40. See id. at 39 for a description of some of the first copyright lobbying:
“[The Stationers] came up to Parliament in the form of petitioners, with tears in their
eyes, hopeless and forlorn; they brought with them their wives and children to excite
compassion, and induce Parliament to grant them statutory security.”
45
Statute of Anne, 1710, 8 Ann., c. 19 (Eng.).
40
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nothing on the market until an author assigns the rights to a
publisher . . . the real player in the legal and commercial game.”46
In the same manner, in the music industry, middle men and
distributors like recording companies see themselves as the “real
players,” vital to the success of musicians.
2. Early Development of U.K. Copyright Law
English copyright law developed rapidly and by 1801, it had
clearly abandoned the requirement of registration to gain
protection.47 By 1814 the law had also abandoned the specific
years as a basis for the term of protection, settling instead on a
period of protection based on the lifetime of the author.48 Rights
have been added under U.K. legislation as the types of intellectual
creation have increased and new methods of distribution have been
created.49 A public performance right for dramatic works was first
added by the Dramatic Literary Property Act 1833,50 and
subsequently extended to cover musical works in the Copyright
Act of 1842.51 Sound recordings gained protection in 1911.52
Films and broadcasts were added in their own right, relatively late,
in 1956.53
3. Current U.K. Copyright Law
Both copyrights and related rights are currently protected in the
U.K. primarily under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988
(“CDPA”),54 as amended. The CDPA “confers rights on the
authors (and their assignees) of a number of different types of
intellectual creation which are listed exhaustively in section 1 of

46

See VAIDHYANATHAN, supra note 21, at 40.
Copyright Act, 1801, 41 Geo. 3, c. 107 (Eng.).
48
William Patry, The Failure of the American Copyright System: Protecting the Idle
Rich, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 907, 916 (1997).
49
Daniel J. Gervais, Towards a New Core International Copyright Norm: The Reverse
Three-Step Test, 9 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 1, 5 (2005).
50
3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 15, § 1 (Eng.).
51
5 & 6 Vict., c. 45, § 20 (Eng.).
52
Copyright Act, 1911, 1 & 2 Geo. 5, c. 46, § 19 (Eng.).
53
Copyright Act, 1956, 4 & 5 Eliz. 2, c. 74, §§ 13, 14 (Eng.).
54
Copyrights Designs and Patents Act, 1988, c. 48 (Eng.).
47
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the 1988 Act.”55 The Act introduced a number of new rights, such
as rental rights in respect of sound recordings, films and computer
programs,56 and, for the first time in U.K. law, a comprehensive
system of rights for performers and moral rights for authors.57
For a song, a number of rights may arise simultaneously—
musical copyright in the sounds, literary copyright in the words
and a sound recording right in the recording itself.58 Performers’
rights may also arise in relation to the performance of the work.59
All of these rights may have the same or different owners. The
rights in the music and words will often be owned initially by the
composer and lyricist, but will then be assigned to a publishing
company.60 Copyright in the sound recording will generally
initially vest in the producer, a recording company.61 Certain of
the performers’ rights can also be assigned to another person
(generally the recording company again) under an “exclusive
recording contract.”62 Copyright in the sound recording and the
performers’ rights both have a shorter duration (fifty years)63 than
the copyright in the words and music of a song (life of author plus
seventy years).64
E. Effect of European Copyright Directives
Although U.K. legislation is written in Westminster, it is in
reality constrained by both E.U. law, which seeks to achieve the
harmonization of copyright protection within the countries of the

55

CTR. FOR INTELLECTUAL PROP. & INFO. LAW, UNIV. OF CAMBRIDGE, REVIEW OF THE
ECONOMIC EVIDENCE RELATING TO AN EXTENSION OF THE TERM OF COPYRIGHT IN SOUND
RECORDINGS
5
(2005),
available
at
http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/d/
gowers_cipilreport.pdf.
56
Copyright Designs and Patents Act, 1988, c. 48, § 18(2) (Eng.).
57
Id. §§ 77–89.
58
Id. §§ 3, 5.
59
Id. Part II.
60
See id. §§ 3, 11.
61
See id. §§ 9, 11.
62
See id. § 185.
63
Id. §§ 13, 14.
64
Id. § 12. The Copyright Designs and Patent Act was amended in 1995, extending
the duration of copyright in literary, dramatic, musical or artistic works. Duration of
Copyright and Rights in Related Performances, 1995, S.I. 1995/3297 (U.K.).
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European Union, and to a lesser extent by the international
copyright treaties to which the U.K. is a signatory.
1. E.U. Copyright Term Extension
Until 1993, copyright was protected under national law in the
European Union. Most countries protected a work for a minimum
of the life of the author plus fifty years,65 but not all European
countries were Berne signatories.66 The 1993 Directive extended
and harmonized the term of protection for all copyrighted works
across Europe to the life of the author plus seventy years,67 and for
related rights to fifty years.68
The minimum term of protection for copyright, of life plus fifty
years, originally laid down in the Berne Convention,69 was
intended to provide protection for the author and the first two
generations of his descendants.70 The increase in the term of
protection in the 1993 Directive to life plus seventy years was
justified on the basis that life expectancy in Europe, and elsewhere,
had increased, making it necessary to increase the term of
protection so as to ensure that the intention in the Berne
Convention was still honored.71 As has been pointed out by
William Patry,72 the logic of the extension argument is faulty. If
life expectancy increases, then the author also lives longer, and can
presumably continue to make provision during his longer life for
his heirs.73 Patry demonstrated that the increased protection is
likely to benefit even fifth generation descendants.74
The
“[e]xtension of protection to such remote heirs is impossible to

65

See Berne Convention, supra note 32, art. 7(1).
For example, several Eastern European countries (including Latvia, Lithuania, and
the Czech Republic) did not join until the 1990s. See World Intellectual Property
Organization, Contracting Parties: Berne Convention, http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/
ShowResults.jsp?lang=en&treaty_id=15 (last visited Feb. 13, 2009).
67
Council Directive 93/98, art. 3, 1993 O.J. (L 290) 6 (EC).
68
Id. art. 3.
69
See Berne Convention, supra note 32, art. 7(1).
70
See Patry, supra note 48, at 931 n.100.
71
Council Directive 93/98, art. 3, 1993 O.J. (L 290) 5 (EC).
72
See Patry, supra note 48, at 932.
73
Id. at 931.
74
Id.
66
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justify in terms of encouraging the author to create, or any
reasonable societal interest in the author’s immediate heirs.”75
European law requires the protection of the works of foreign
authors in the same manner as European works, except that if the
term of protection in the foreign author’s country is longer than the
European term, then the European term of protection applies,
whereas if the term of protection in the foreign country is shorter
than the European term, then that shorter term applies to protection
in Europe also.76 It was partly this difference in treatment which
caused U.S. lawmakers to increase the duration of copyright
protection in the U.S.77
2. Related Rights
The term of protection for related rights was not similarly
extended by the 1993 Directive and it remained at fifty years.78
This difference reflected the continuing distinction in the European
tradition between creators and performers, and the relatively
greater importance accorded the former as creators of new
material, rather than as the economic exploiters of pre-existing
material.
F. U.S. Copyright Laws and Protection of Performers’ Rights and
Sound Recordings
1. The U.S. Constitution
The Framers of the U.S. Constitution wanted to provide a
balance between creators and innovators and the public.79 The
U.S. Constitution required Congress to make laws “to promote the
progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to
authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective
writings and discoveries.”80 The language makes explicit that the
75

Id. at 932.
See CTR. FOR INTELLECTUAL PROP. & INFO. LAW, supra note 55, at 4.
77
See Patry supra note 48, at 924.
78
Council Directive 93/98, art. 3, 1993 O.J. (L 290) 5 (EC).
79
See Lawrence Lessig, Copyright’s First Amendment, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1057, 1072
(2001).
80
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (emphasis added).
76
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Framers recognized that the interests of the public and the interests
of creators had to be balanced, and, arguably, their formula “to
promote the progress of the sciences and useful arts” put the
interests of the public first.81 James Madison, who introduced the
copyright and patent clause into the Constitution, argued in The
Federalist that it would increase access to information and operate
as an incentive system for creators.82 For more than 120 years
U.S. copyright law adhered to a regime of fairly limited
protection,83 the public domain was strong,84 and copyright
protection correspondingly weaker.85
The structure of copyright protection in the U.S. remains
somewhat different from the U.K. or Europe, being less specific in
terms of rights protected and providing for a more general fair use
exemption, “that can adapt to new technical environments” rather
than the more specific fair dealing, found under U.K. law.86 Under
U.S. law sound recordings and performance rights are not treated
as a lesser type of related right and afforded a type of sui generis
protection (as they are in Europe) but are protected for the same
length of time and in the same manner as true copyrights.87
2. Early U.S. Copyright Law
Unlike either European law, or U.K. law, from the first
Copyright Act of 179088 (which borrowed heavily from the Statute
of Anne) to 1976,89 U.S. law stuck to the utilitarian bargain,
required registration to protect copyright, and provided a fixed
term of protection (extendable through additional filing

81

Id.
See THE FEDERALIST NO. 43 (James Madison).
83
See VAIDHYANATHAN, supra note 21, at 25. In 1831 the copyright term remained a
twenty-eight year term, renewable for fourteen years. Under the 1909 act, the term was
extended to a twenty-eight year term, renewable for twenty-eight more years. Id.
84
See, e.g., Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991) (relying on
Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879), to deny copyright protection to a list of names,
towns and telephone numbers); Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591 (1834).
85
See VAIDHYANATHAN, supra note 21, at 25.
86
See GOWERS, supra note 7, at 62.
87
See Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, §§ 102, 103, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976).
88
Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124 (Copyright Act of 1790).
89
Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541.
82
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requirements) independent of the author’s lifespan.90
The
registration requirement and its formalities had the disadvantage of
disproportionately benefiting established publishers, and other
distributors of copyrighted work with access to lawyers, rather than
individual authors and creators, who lost countless copyrights by
failure to comply with the procedural filing requirements and
deadlines,91 but precisely because copyright did not arise
automatically and was for a fixed term of years, a strong public
domain was assured.
3. U.S. Copyright Law Post 1988
In 1989, the U.S. changed its longstanding copyright tradition
by acceding to the Berne Convention,92 which required it to change
its law to protect copyrighted work from creation, without the need
for formalities.93 In all Berne Convention signatory countries,
copyright must arise automatically on the creation of work, and
last for at least the author’s life and fifty years after his death.94 In
1998, partly to harmonize with E.U. law, U.S. law was further
amended to increase the term of copyright protections from life
plus fifty years, to life plus seventy years, or ninety-five years for
works made for hire.95
Since U.S. law treated performers’ rights and rights in sound
recordings in the same manner as copyrights, the duration of these
rights was also extended, and although it harmonized the term of
copyright protection in the E.U. and U.S., the new law created a
significant difference between the duration of protection for related
rights in the two jurisdictions.

90

See VAIDHYANATHAN, supra note 21, at 79.
See Patry, supra note 48, at 922 & n.72.
92
Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853
(1988).
93
17 U.S.C. § 408 (1988).
94
See Berne Convention, supra note 32, art. 7(1).
95
Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998, 17 U.S.C. §§ 302(a), 302(b)
(1998).
91
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4. Sound Recordings
The position of sound recordings in the U.S. is actually even
more complicated since U.S. law did not protect sound recordings
as copyrighted works before 1972,96 and the law was modified in
1976,97 and again in 1998,98 to harmonize it with international
standards. This means that the term of protection in respect of
sound recordings depends on the date of a particular recording’s
creation. It has also not yet been clarified by court decision as to
whether the “effective beneficiaries of the copyright extensions
effected by the Sony Bono Act are authors rather than transferees
of copyright.”99
Various international treaties currently set minimum terms of
protection for sound recordings. The fifty year term is “established
as the most widely prevailing.”100 This is the minimum term
required by the TRIPs Agreement101 (seventy-five contracting
parties including the U.K. and U.S.) and the WIPO Performance
and Phonograph Treaty102 (fifty-eight parties including the U.S.,
but not the U.K.). The earlier Rome Convention103 (to which the
U.S. is not a party), requires the duration of copyright in sound
recordings to be not less than twenty years from the date the sound
recording was made. The Universal Copyright Convention sets the
duration of copyright for sound recordings at twenty-five years.104
No international treaty requires a minimum protection for
sound recordings approaching the current U.S. protection of life
plus seventy years or ninety-five years. The extended duration of
the U.S. term, coupled with the globalization of the music and

96

See Press Release, U.S. Copyright Office, Registration for Foreign Recordings (Mar.
1972), available at http:/www.copyright.gov/history/mls/ML-83.pdf.
97
See Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 114 (1976).
98
See Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998.
99
See CTR. FOR INTELLECTUAL PROP. & INFO. LAW, supra note 55, at 8 (referring to the
Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998).
100
Id.
101
See TRIPs Agreement, supra note 34, art. 12.
102
See WIPO Treaty, supra note 34, art. 17.
103
See Rome Convention, supra note 33, art. 14.
104
See Universal Copyright Convention, supra note 34, art. 4, § 2(a).
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other copyright-rich industries, and fear of digital technology,105
has led to intense lobbying, especially by the music industry in
Europe to extend the term of protection for related rights to
achieve parity with the U.S.106
II. THE COPYRIGHT SYSTEM AND THE DIGITAL THREAT
A. Gowers’ Remit
The effects of globalization and changes in technology have
increasingly preoccupied not only the music industry and its users,
but also governments.
In 2005, the U.K. government
commissioned Andrew Gowers to conduct a review to consider
whether, in the light of these two phenomena—globalization and
technological innovations—the U.K. intellectual property system
remained fit for purpose in the twenty-first century.107 Gowers
sought input from as many stakeholders in the IP system as
possible. In the case of copyright law, hearing from, among
others, musicians, film producers, and other copyright owners,
libraries, technology providers, the BBC, consumer groups,
schools, and members of the general public.108 His review of the
whole IP system was published on the eve of the December 2006
budget by the then Chancellor, Gordon Brown.109

105

See, e.g., MUSIC BUSINESS GROUP, RESPONSE TO UK-IPO CONSULTATIONS ON
COPYRIGHT EXCEPTIONS 13, available at http://www.bpi.co.uk/pdf/MBG_Formatshifting
_Response.pdf (describing studies that suggest ninety percent of music on iPods was
copied and not purchased).
106
Eric Bangeman, U.K. Government Resists Music Industry Pressure, Caps
Copyrights at 50 Years, ARS TECHNICA, July 24, 2007, http://arstechnica.com/techpolicy/news/2007/07/uk-government-resists-music-industry-pressure-caps-copyrights-at50-years.ars.
107
See GOWERS, supra note 7, at 1.
108
See id. app. B.
109
See Press Release, HMTreasury, Gowers Sets Out Intellectual Property System Fit
for the Digital Age (Dec. 6, 2006), available at http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/
prebud_pbr06_pressgowers.htm.
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B. Responses to the Digital Age
In the last ten years there have been many responses to the
changes wrought by digital technology on the landscape of
copyright and related rights but they all fall into three main
categories. Some commentators make the point that many other
(equally momentous at the time) changes in technology have
appeared in the past to make the current legal system obsolete, but
after an initial period of adjustment, it has always survived.110 In
their view, we are currently in another such period of adjustment
and no radical changes to the legal system are required.111 Others,
mainly copyright owners, argue, however, that since digital
technology has made copying so much easier, the adequate
protection of their rights requires a strengthening of the whole
copyright system, including an increase in the duration of
protection.112 Finally, various academics and technology mavens,
particularly, assert that while digital technology has indeed
changed the status quo, the best response is not to strengthen the
law, but to radically change, or even abolish it, because the current
legal regime is totally unsuited to the realities of the digital age.113
1. The “Do-Nothing” Argument
In Who Controls the Internet, Goldsmith and Wu argue that
each new change in technology has been treated with horror by
copyright owners and complaints that it has completely upset the
balance between owners of copyright and end-users.114 Copyright
owners have variously complained that the introduction of sheet

110

See, e.g., JACK GOLDSMITH & TIM WU, WHO CONTROLS THE INTERNET?: ILLUSIONS

OF A BORDERLESS WORLD 125 (2006).
111

Id.
See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, Conflicting Visions and Contested Baselines: Intellectual
Property and Free Speech in the “Digital Millennium”, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1318, 1321
(2005) (“[For many copyright owners,] the crucial aspect of the status quo is not legal but
economic” since “[digital] media make it possible to make a virtually infinite number of
exact copies at little or no cost.”).
113
See, e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: THE NATURE AND FUTURE OF
CREATIVITY 184–94 (2004) [hereinafter FREE CULTURE] (arguing that the permission
culture created by today’s copyright system is inefficient).
114
See GOLDSMITH & WU, supra note 110, at 125.
112
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music, the gramophone, photocopiers,115 VCRs,116 and every
technology in between, would allow copying of copyrighted
material and destroy their businesses. Now they make similar
charges about file-sharing.117 Complaints come consistently with
the advent of each new change in technology, or methods of
distribution, and the argument is always that copyright owners
need stronger rights to incentivize and protect creativity,118 but as
people become familiar with each new technology, and incorporate
it into their business, complaints of copyright infringement settle
down.119 Given this history, it is safe to assume that the new
internet and digital technologies will follow a similar path and that
there is no need to change the law to accommodate these new
technologies, any more than was necessary for their predecessors.
2. Strengthen Copyright Protection
Copyright owners, however, believe that changes in the law are
urgently required by the ubiquity of digital technology. Jack
Valenti (former President of MPAA) was unapologetic in his view
that the recording industry would be destroyed by the new
technology and needed to fight back.120 Chairman of the Senate
Judiciary Committee, Senator Orrin Hatch favored remotely
destroying the computers of those who illegally downloaded
music.121 The industry has lobbied hard for some time to extend
the term of copyright in sound recordings, raise awareness of its
115

See Gervais, supra note 49, at 3 n.6.
See FREE CULTURE, supra note 113, at 76 (2004). Former president of the MPAA
Jack Valenti likened VCRs to tapeworms that would eat “away at the very heart and
essence of the most precious asset the copyright owner has, his copyright.” Id.
117
See Farber, supra note 112, at 1338.
118
See, e.g., Congressional Budget Office, Copyright issues in Digital Media, at vii
(2004). (“In the past, the emergence of new technologies . . . has threatened to tilt the
scales of the copyright regime by loosening the control that copyright owners enjoy over
subsequent uses of their works.”).
119
See GOLDSMITH & WU, supra note 110, at 124.
120
See Privacy and Piracy: The Paradox of Illegal File Sharing on Peer-To-Peer
Networks and the Impact of Technology on the Entertainment Industry: Hearing Before
the Permanent Subcomm. On Investigations of the S. Comm. on Gov’t Affairs, 108th
Cong. 17 (2003) (statement of Jack Valenti, President and Chief Executive Officer,
Motion Picture Association of America).
121
Ted Bridis, Senator Favors Really Punishing Music Thieves, CHI. TRIB., June 18,
2003, at 2C.
116
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rights and push for stronger enforcement.122 The copyright
owners’ views are that the digital age changes the status quo, so
that the broad fair use rights which were recognized in the predigital era no longer make economic sense.123 Now that users can
make virtually infinite numbers of perfect copies, stronger legal
protection is required to protect and support the economic rights of
IP owners,124 and copyright owners have mounted an increasingly
aggressive campaign in the media,125 the courts and the
legislatures, against any unauthorized taking of copyrighted
materials which the new technology makes ever easier.126
Unfortunately for copyright owners, extended legal protections
have increased neither compliance with, nor respect for, the law.
The copyright legal regime is finding itself more and more at odds
with social practice. Copyright protections in sound recordings
have become widely ignored by the general public.127 The Gowers
Review noted that as a result of the ease with which the law can be
circumvented, “copyright in the U.K. presently suffers from a
marked lack of public legitimacy. It is perceived to be overly
restrictive, with little guilt or sanction associated with
infringement.”128 “Downloading music and films from the internet
is now the most common legal offence committed by young people
aged between 10 and 25 in the U.K.”129
“According to a report commissioned by the British
Phonographic Industry (BPI), file-sharing cost the music industry
£414 million in lost sales in 2005, on total sales of £1.87
122

See, e.g., GOWERS supra note 7, at 96; FREE CULTURE, supra note 113, at 218
(discussing some of the major media companies’ efforts to increase the term of
copyrights culminating in the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act).
123
See Farber, supra note 112, at 1321.
124
See id.
125
Carrie-Ann Skinner, Virgin Music Campaigns Against Illegal File-Sharing, PC
WORLD,
June
6,
2008,
http://www.pcworld.com/article/146785/virgin_music
_campaigns_against_illegal_filesharing.html; Ted Bridis, Music Industry to Target CD
Pirates in 12 Cities, BOSTON GLOBE, May 3, 2006.
126
See, e.g., GOWERS, supra note 7, at 103–06 (describing government policy and
litigation alternatives on enforcing IP rights).
128
Ted Bridis, Most Music Downloaders Say They Don’t Care About the Law, CHI. SUN
TIMES, Aug. 1, 2003, at 43.
128
See GOWERS, supra note 7, at 39.
129
Id. at 27.
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billion.”130 The position is similar all over the world. In the U.S.
the recording industry has responded by suing thousands of its own
customers for downloading copyrighted material without
permission from the internet.131 As the Gowers Review noted, the
lawsuits have not halted the illegal downloading of copyrighted
material.132
3. Complete Overhaul of Copyright Argument
Due to the immense shift in technology and its effects,
commentators outside the music business go further than arguing
in favor of a return to the weaker copyright and a strong public
domain which prevailed in the U.S. until 1976,133 and argue that
the copyright model itself is totally unsuited to the digital age.134
According to Daniel Farber, “[A] new technology always presents
the question of whether an existing legal regime should apply.”135
Lawrence Lessig, among others, believes that the balance in
copyright law embodied in the Constitution, has become so skewed
by the powerful economic and corporate forces in favor of
protecting the monopoly rights of media corporations for near
perpetual terms, that a radical overhaul of copyright law is now
needed.136
The debate has become particularly intense in the last few
years as each side, particularly in the U.S., strives to “portray
themselves as defending the status quo ante—the [IP] regime as it
existed before it was disturbed.”137 Farber calls those who view IP
130

Id.
Editorial, Stopping Music Piracy…, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 27, 2008, at C28.
132
See GOWERS, supra note 7, at 101, 102 chart 5.5.
133
See, e.g., VAIDYHANATHAN, supra note 21, 15–16 (arguing for “thin copyright
protection” that is just long enough to encourage creativity, but not enough to chill a rich
public domain).
134
John Perry Barlow, The Economy of Ideas: A Framework for Patents and
Copyrights in the Digital Age. (Everything You Know About Intellectual Property is
Wrong), WIRED, Mar. 1994, available at http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/2.03/
economy.ideas.html (“Intellectual property law cannot be patched, retrofitted, or
expanded to contain digitized expression . . . [w]e will need to develop an entirely new
set of methods as befits this entirely new set of circumstances.”).
135
See Farber, supra note 112, at 1322.
136
See id. at 1326–27.
137
Id. at 1320.
131
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rights as “generating a supply of investment funds for innovation”
the neo-Hamiltonians because like Alexander Hamilton, they argue
for strong support from government for industry.138 These neoHamiltonians support strong IP rights and economic dominance by
the music and media industries.139 He calls the other side neoJeffersonians, because like Thomas Jefferson before them, they
champion the smaller players and look to “a decentralized future—
in which the Internet and other digital technologies will place
public discourse and economic innovation in the people’s
hands.”140 Whatever the different concepts are called, and whoever
claims to be representing the status quo, there is a great deal of
agreement outside government and the copyright industries, that
the duration of copyright protection has become too long and is
detrimental to the creation and the dissemination of information in
the digital era.141
III. THE GOWERS REVIEW
The Gowers Review was refreshing and unusually independent
of the influence of the special interests which tend to dominate this
debate. It avoided the doom-laden warnings and rhetoric which
both the music industry and academics bring to the debate over
how the copyright system needs to be adapted to the digital era.142
The Review described the ideal IP system as creating “incentives
for innovation, without unduly limiting access for consumers and
follow-on innovators,”143 explicitly returning to the forefront of the
138

Id.
See id.
140
Id. at 1319.
141
See, e.g., Patry, supra note 48, at 908 (“United States copyright law has failed of its
essential purpose—to benefit authors—and is being shaped largely by powerful
distributors and their lobbyists with the dual goals of extending a monopoly . . . while
simultaneously depriving authors of as much money as possible.”); FREE CULTURE, supra
note 113, at 231–33 (2004) (describing the collection of lawyers, organizations,
corporations, professors, and economists who submitted briefs in Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537
U.S. 186 (2002), arguing for a limited term of copyright).
142
See New Ideas About New Ideas, ECONOMIST, Dec. 9, 2006, at 66 (stating the
rational, evidence based report will anger the entertainment industry which used “siren
songs” to win over politicians).
143
See GOWERS, supra note 7, at 1.
139
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debate the fundamental importance of balance between creators
and end-users.
Unlike commentators on both sides, the Review did not view
the current legal system as hopelessly broken. It pronounced a
“qualified ‘yes’” to the question of whether the U.K. intellectual
property system was “fit for purpose in an era of globalisation,
digitisation and increasing economic specialisation.”144 The report
dealt with all areas of IP law,145 considering evidence from a broad
array of stakeholders, on the U.K.’s current system of IP protection
and how well it is functioning,146 before reviewing in turn, the
instruments of the intellectual property system and whether they
were “balanced, coherent and flexible,” the operation of the system
and how rights are awarded, used and enforced, and the
governance of the system.147 The Review was comprehensive and
weighed the arguments made by all stakeholders before setting out
its recommendations. The recommendations for changes to the
law that the Review made which are relevant to this paper are,
largely, not the changes sought by copyright owners.148

A. Findings and Recommendations
1. Term of Protection for Sound Recordings
The Review found that the length of protection for copyright
works “already far exceeds the incentives required to invest in new
works.”149 In terms of the correct balance for copyrights, the
Review made two recommendations: first, that the fifty year term
of protection currently provided in Europe for sound recordings
should not be extended, and second, that the government should

144

Id.
Id. (stating the report took “a holistic view of the [IP] system”).
146
Id. at 5.
147
Id.
148
See Bill Thompson, Intellectual Property Battle Rages On, BBC NEWS, Dec. 8,
2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/6162139.stm.
149
See GOWERS, supra note 7, at 50.
145
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adopt the principle that the term and scope of IP rights should no
longer be altered retrospectively.150
The Review started by acknowledging the academic and
popular debate about the optimal length of copyright and related
rights protection. It listed five arguments advanced in the Call for
Evidence in favor of extending the term of protection for sound
recordings: parity with other countries (particularly the U.S.),
fairness between composers and performers, increasing incentives
to invest in new music, increasing incentives to keep work
commercially available, and the maintenance of a positive trade
balance for the successful U.K. music industry, and discussed each
briefly.151
In assessing the parity argument, the Review noted that
comparing U.S. and E.U. law is not a comparison of like with
like.152 While U.S. law provides a longer term of protection, it
contains various provisions which limit its breadth. Rights holders
in the E.U. earn royalties for almost all public performances of
their work,153 while in the U.S. only play on digital radio earns
royalties,154 and the Bars and Grills Exception155 means that
“around 70 per cent of eating and drinking establishments, and 45
per cent of shops, do not have to pay royalties to performers.”156
The Review concluded that rights in Europe (although shorter)
may even be worth more than rights in the U.S.157 Although
Gowers did not use this argument, it is also worth pointing out that
the U.S. term is anomalous—other countries have a variety of
different durations of, and breadth of, rights, but none protect
sound recordings and other related rights for as long as the U.S.
term.158
Gowers dismissed the fairness argument made on behalf of
performers on the basis that copyright law, as a whole, is about
150
151
152
153
154
155
156
157
158

See id. at 6.
See id. at 49.
See id. at 49–50.
See id. at 50.
17 U.S.C § 106(6) (2006).
See id. § 110(5) (2006).
GOWERS, supra note 7, at 49.
Id. at 50.
See IVIR REPORT, supra note 12, at 32, 85–91.
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fairness, as exemplified by the bargain between rights owners and
society, giving the former a monopoly to incentivize creation.159
The length of that monopoly is already longer than needed to
incentivize creation according to various economists.160 It is also
unclear that any extension would benefit performers, rather than
the recording companies to whom they have often assigned their
rights.161 Moreover, after fifty years, few, other than a small band
of highly successful artists, would benefit from any increases in
income.162 For these reasons, any extension of the term of
protection is unlikely to reach more than a few, already very wellpaid, performers, but is likely to provide a windfall for recording
companies with active back catalogs.
Gowers did not address the argument that there is a relatively
lesser risk in performing already created material (the job of the
performers), rather than creating new material (the job of
composers), which is the reason that related rights were initially
created in Europe, and internationally, if not in the U.S., as a
lesser, economic right more akin to industrial property rather than
copyright.163
The argument that an extension will increase investment in
new music was dismissed by Gowers for a variety of reasons.
Economic evidence has shown that the “extension for new works
creates at most 1 per cent value for a twenty year prospective
extension . . . [and] has negligible effect on investment
decisions.”164 According to Gowers, plenty of artists are vying to
create new music, likely without considering whether the song will
fall out of copyright in fifty, or ninety-five years time.165
Unfortunately the Review did not specifically address the
record companies’ arguments that, even if calculations about the
length of legal protection do not affect the decisions of individual
artists, corporate investment decisions are based on incentives like
159
160
161
162
163
164
165

See GOWERS, supra note 7, at 50.
Id.
See id. at 50–51; IVIR REPORT, supra note 12, at 133.
See GOWERS, supra note 7, at 51.
See IVIR REPORT, supra note 12, at 132–34.
GOWERS, supra note 7, at 52.
See id.
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the length of term of protection of sound recordings.166 This
industry argument is not a strong one because any investment
decision ought to be based on current law and economic
conditions, not on the possibility of change.
Gowers did note that, “[e]vidence suggests that most sound
recordings sell in the ten years after release, and only a very small
percentage continue to generate income . . . for the entire duration
of copyright.”167 Thus any extension of the duration of related
rights would lock up that music without providing significant
income for reinvestment to the producers.
There is a similar issue with another music industry argument
that a longer duration for related rights would ensure that more
music would be available to the consumer.168 The Review found
evidence that those “without legal rights have made more historic
U.S. recordings available than have rights holders.”169
Additionally, there would be an impact of extension on
musicians themselves: “[i]f works [were] protected for a longer
period of time, follow-on creators . . . would have to negotiate
licenses to use the work during that extended period” and could be
blocked by the estates and heirs of performers as well as facing the
problem of tracing rights holders.170 The Review found that such
limiting of the public domain by longer terms of protection would
be more likely to restrict rather than stimulate creativity.171
2. Exceptions and Limitations to Copyright Protection
In terms of the flexibility of copyright protection in the U.K.,
the Review made four recommendations to amend U.K. law to
introduce or clarify certain limited exceptions to copyright. The
recommendations were to
[i]ntroduce a limited private copying exception . . .
for the format shifting of works . . . [; to] allow
166
167
168
169
170
171

See id. at 49, 52.
Id. at 52.
See id. at 49.
Id. at 54.
Id.
See id.
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private copying for research to cover all forms of
content . . . [; to] propose that [E.U. Directive]
2001/29/EC172 be amended to allow for an
exception for creative, transformative or derivative
works, within the parameters of the Berne Three
Step Test . . . [; and to] create an exception to
copyright for the purpose of caricature, parody or
pastiche.173
All of these exceptions would strengthen the public domain
and limit the rights of copyright owners.174
The lack of a private copying exception under U.K. law makes
it illegal for someone to copy a CD they own to a computer,
something most of the British public do anyway. Gowers was
concerned that this “entirely legitimate activity” should be seen as
such by the law.175 The Review recommended that the exception
should be very limited, only allowing one copy to be made for
private use of music already owned in a different format, but
should not be accompanied by the “blunt instrument” of a levy, as
it is in some European legal systems, especially as “[t]he European
Commission is reviewing the entire body of copyright law, and is
specifically investigating whether levies work.”176
The other two recommendations made by Gowers for the
flexibility of U.K. copyright law—to create an exception for
transformative use, or derivative works, and to create an exception
for caricature, parody or pastiche—would also bring U.K. law
more in line with U.S. law. As Gowers noted, the first
recommendation to create a copyright exception for transformative
use is not even possible under current U.K. law because it is not
one of the exceptions permitted by the E.U. Information Society
Directive.177 Gowers recommended that the U.K. government seek
to amend that Directive to permit such an exception on the grounds
that “[t]ransforming works can create huge value and spur on
172
173
174
175
176
177

Council Directive 2001/29, art. 5, 2001 O.J. (L 167) 10, 16 (EC).
GOWERS, supra note 7, at 6.
See id. at 61.
Id. at 63.
Id.
Id. at 68; see also Council Directive 2001/29, art. 5, 2001 O.J. (L 167) 10, 16 (EC).
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innovation.”178 Beethoven and Mozart were both mentioned as
composers who recycled themes and segments of prior works.179
Gowers also used comments from The Beastie Boys, and a
discussion of hip hop music’s homogenization as licensing rights
get more expensive, to argue in favor of this exception.180
The Information Society Directive does, however, specifically
allow for caricature, parody and pastiche, so this recommendation
could be enshrined in U.K. law without the need for a change to
European legislation.181 The Review used comments from the
BBC, regarding how much easier it would make clearing
programming, to explain its recommendation of this exception.182
Unlike term extension for sound recordings, where Gowers’
recommendation was not to harmonize U.K. law with U.S. law,
these recommended limitations, if adopted, would have the effect
of making the copyright exceptions under U.K. law more similar to
U.S. exceptions. Gowers argued that exceptions “can create
economic value without damaging the interests of copyright
owners” by allowing others to use and build on copyright works.183
The Review mentioned the Creative Commons movement to show
“that not all creators are opposed to their work being used to create
economic value for someone else.”184
While enabling libraries to copy and format shift for archival
purposes has not excited much comment, the music industry has
been unhappy to varying degrees with all the other exceptions
recommended by Gowers, and particularly with the private
copying exception. The music industry’s arguments are reviewed
later in this paper.185

178

GOWERS, supra note 7, at 67.
See id.; Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, From J.C. Bach to Hip Hop: Musical Borrowing,
Copyright and Cultural Context, 84 N.C. L. REV. 547, 604–05 (2006).
180
See GOWERS, supra note 7, at 67 (quoting the Beastie Boys saying “we can’t just go
crazy and sample everything and anything . . .” as much as they would like).
181
Council Directive 2001/29, art. 5 § 3(k), 2001 O.J. (L 167) 10, 16 (EC).
182
See GOWERS, supra note 7, at 68.
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Id. at 62.
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Id.
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See infra notes 206–14, 263–66 and accompanying text.
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3. Penalties for Copyright Infringement
In terms of law enforcement, the Gowers Review did make
some concessions to copyright owners, recognizing the difficulties
they have in enforcing their rights in a digital medium. Its
recommendations were that penalties for online and physical
copyright infringement should be matched to make the law more
coherent,186 and that rights holders in the U.K. should continue to
“[o]bserve the industry agreement of protocols for sharing data
between ISPs and rights holders to remove and disbar users
engaged in ‘piracy.’”187 If this has not proved successful by the
end of 2007, the recommendation is that the U.K. government
should consider whether to legislate to require ISPs to assist
copyright holders in protecting their rights.188
The issue here is illegal file-sharing, which Gowers recognized
as jeopardizing “the value of rights held by content industries.”189
However, the Review also noted that the lawsuits used by the
entertainment industry to pursue infringers have not led to a
significant reduction in the activity.190 The Review discussed the
concepts of “contributory infringement and inducement”191 under
U.S. law, but declined to suggest legislative changes for the U.K.,
on the grounds “that secondary liability on technology purveyors
would stifle the availability of public domain works and may chill
technological innovation.”192
The Review preferred the idea of encouraging rights owners
and ISPs to collaborate on identifying and disbarring users from
engaging in illegal downloading, although it admitted that making
ISPs liable for secondary infringement might not be compatible
with E.U. laws,193 presumably because of privacy issues. Indeed,
the European Court of Justice recently held that nothing in E.U.
law required that member states impose a legal obligation on ISPs
186
187
188
189
190
191
192
193

See GOWERS, supra note 7, at 98.
Id. at 103.
Id.
Id. at 101.
Id. at 101, 102 chart 5.5.
Id. at 102.
Id.
Id.

VOL19_BOOK3_MONSEAU

2009]

4/21/2009 10:10:40 PM

E.U. COPYRIGHT TERM EXTENSION

659

to disclose personal data relating to customers suspected of illegal
file-sharing to help in a civil action for copyright infringement.194
Predictably, many in the music industry have not greeted any
of the Gowers recommendations warmly.195 The music industry
does not feel that it has had much support from the ISPs in policing
the web for illegal file-sharing in the past.196 Even if recording
companies are able to obtain records from ISPs, and ISPs were to
shut down the accounts of egregious file-sharers, those individuals
can usually get another internet account relatively quickly and
easily. The industry is wary of collaboration with technology
companies whose new technologies are often seen as the cause of
the problems of the music business.
B. Opposing Views in the U.K. and Another Government Proposal
Although the Gowers Review recommendations on the
duration of the term of related rights, and specific exceptions to
copyright were quickly adopted as U.K. government policy,197 the
House of Commons Culture Media and Sports Committee Report,
published shortly after Gowers, disagreed with the Gowers’
recommendation on the duration of the term of protection for
sound recordings.198
This government report recommended
extending the term of protection for related rights to the life of the
author plus seventy years accorded to copyrights.199 It adopted
many of the music industries’ arguments, particularly those on
parity between performers and consumers, stating:
194

Case C-275/06, Productores de Música De Espaňa v. Telefónica de Espaňa SAU,
2008 E.C.R. I-00271.
195
The day after the Gowers Review was published, a large number of well-known
figures in the music world took out a full page advertisement in a major national paper
denouncing the Review’s finding. See Musicians Sign Copyright Advert, BBC NEWS,
Dec. 7, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/entertainment/6216152.stm.
196
Paul McGuinness, Manager for U2, Address at MIDEM, Cannes (Jan. 28, 2008),
available
at
http://www.billboard.biz/bbbiz/content_display/industry/
e3i062b16e707aa99916c212e660cbffd3e.
197
See PRE-BUDGET REPORT, supra note 5, at 60.
198
See SELECT COMMITTEE ON CULTURE, MEDIA AND SPORT, NEW MEDIA AND THE
CREATIVE INDUSTRIES, FIFTH REPORT, 2006–7, H.C. 509-II, available at
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200607/cmselect/cmcumeds/509/50902.htm
[hereinafter FIFTH REPORT].
199
Id. ¶ 236.
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We strongly believe that copyright represents a
moral right of a creator to choose to retain
ownership and control of their own intellectual
property. We have not heard a convincing reason
why a composer and his or her heirs should benefit
from a term of copyright which extends for lifetime
and beyond, but a performer should not.200
Although it commended the Gowers Review as “thorough,” it
suggested that the Gowers team had ignored all but economic
arguments in its deliberations on extending protection for sound
recordings and other related rights.201 In the Committee’s view,
the strength and importance of the entertainment industry in the
U.K. made it particularly strange “that the protection of intellectual
property rights should be weaker” in the U.K. than in countries
with less successful industries.202 The Committee did not appear
to consider that the relatively weaker protection might be
contributing to the creativity and strength of the industry.
While faulting Gowers for presenting only economic
arguments relating to term extension, the Committee failed itself to
present or discuss any major arguments, contenting itself with
vague references to the vibrancy, importance and strength of the
U.K. music industry and the morality and fairness arguments to
support its conclusion that a term extension was necessary.203
In a statement before Parliament by the Secretary of State for
Culture, Media and Sport, James Purnell, the Government
congratulated the Select Committee on the Report “highlighting
the strength and vibrancy of the U.K.’s creative industries,” but
refused to adopt its recommendations since they were in
disagreement with Gowers, which it stressed was an independent
report.204 The Secretary also mentioned the independent report
200
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Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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DEPARTMENT FOR CULTURE, MEDIA AND SPORT, GOVERNMENT RESPONSE TO THE
CULTURE, MEDIA AND SPORT SELECT COMMITTEE REPORT INTO THE NEW MEDIA AND THE
CREATIVE INDUSTRIES, 2007, Cm. 7186, at 1, 11, available at http://www.officialdocuments.gov.uk/document/cm71/7186/7186.asp.
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commissioned by the European Commission as part of its review
of E.U. copyright law,205 which came to essentially the same
conclusion as Gowers on sound recordings, stating:
Taking account of the findings of these reports,
which carefully considered the impact on the
economy as a whole, and without further
substantive evidence to the contrary, it does not
seem appropriate for the Government to press the
Commission for action at this stage.206
The Select Committee report did agree with Gowers on the
need to introduce a private copying exemption into U.K. law, and
on the importance of ISPs and content owners being encouraged to
work together toward finding commercial solutions for the piracy
problem.207 These proposals were accepted by the Government,
which confirmed its commitment to taking forward the Gowers
Review.208
Despite the Gowers Review recommendations being British
Government official policy, a strong movement in the U.K. music
industry continued lobbying for an extension of the term of
protection of sound recordings.209 David Cameron, Conservative
Leader of the Opposition, also made known that he would support
the extension if in office, giving as his reason for doing so the
familiar vibrancy of the British musical scene rationale.210
Also, a private member’s bill was introduced into the U.K.
parliament by M.P. Peter Wishart, a former member of a Scottish
folk-rock group, Runrig, with the aim of extending beyond fifty
205

See id. at 12.
Id.
207
See FIFTH REPORT, supra note 198, ¶¶ 143, 154.
208
See PRE-BUDGET REPORT, supra note 5.
209
See Robert Ashton, Government Signals Extension to Copyright Term, MUSIC WK.,
Dec. 11, 2008, http://www.musicweek.com/story.asp?storyCode=1036431 (“[Term
extension for sound recordings] is a major victory for the music industry, which has been
campaigning for term extension for years.”).
210
David Cameron, Right Honourable, Address to U.K. Music Industry: A Flourishing
Music Scene Plays a Huge Role in Bolstering the Vibrancy of Our Culture (July 6, 2007),
available
at
http://www.conservatives.com/News/Speeches/2007/07/David_
Cameron_A_flourishing_music_scene_plays_a_huge_role_in_bolstering_the_vibrancy_
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years the copyright term of sound recordings.211 The bill was to
receive its second reading before parliament on March 7, 2008, but
it never did.212 However, since it was not supported by the
government, and such an extension would have to be made at the
European level, it seems unlikely that it would have—currently, at
least—had much effect.
C. Post-Gowers Action
In January 2008, the U.K. government published a consultation
document, Taking Forward the Gowers Review on Intellectual
Property, to consult on how the reforms to the law recommended
by Gowers should be made.213 Responses were requested by April
2008, with legislation promised soon after.214 The consultation
document was ninety pages long and invited responses to sixty-six
questions on all aspects of the proposed changes.215 The detail and
specificity of the questions suggested that the U.K. Intellectual
Property Office (“IPO”) was truly interested in fashioning a
copyright law that “is valued by and protects rights holders and is
both understood and respected by users.”216 The questions were
fairly open and input was sought from all affected parties.
The Music Business Group, describing itself as “the collective
view of the U.K.’s music industry,” was quick to submit to the IPO
a persuasive paper on its opposition to almost all of the exceptions
proposed for U.K. copyright law.217 It stated that the music
industry enabled a “value chain” which directly contributes £6
billion to the U.K. economy,218 and copyright “is the core
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Sound Recordings (Copyright Term Extension) Bill, 2007, Bill [33] (Gr. Brit.).
For a history of the bill, see U.K. Parliament Website, Copyright in Sound
Recordings
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mechanism underlying this vast value chain.”219 At present,
according to the industry, because music is transferable into
different formats, much of the value of music is enjoyed by
consumers and technology companies, but creators and right
holders are “effectively excluded from any value.”220
The industry paper contended that allowing an exception to
copyright for format shifting would “enshrine this market failure in
national legislation.”221 Their proposed solution to the problem of
the music business being cut out of the value chain was to require a
license fee to compensate the recording companies for the grant of
a limited private copying exemption.222 Subject to payment of a
commercially negotiated license fee, format shifting should only
be permissible, according to the Music Business Group, if the
initial copy is legitimately owned and retained the copy is made by
the owner, for private use, with no onward distribution,
communication or exploitation.223 Under these conditions the
industry grudgingly conceded that “a fraction of the value gained
by others, and the injustice suffered by creators and rights holders,
is reversed.”224 Some European countries already impose a levy
on private copying, something rejected by Gowers as “a blunt
instrument,” and which is also being reconsidered at the European
level.225
The Music Business Group’s proposal conveniently ignores the
fact that it was technology companies like Apple, and not the
music recording companies themselves, that created and developed
the hardware and software which made the new “value chain” for
music possible.226 Without having been involved during the risky
creation stage, the music industry is now asking for a cut of the
profits. The music industry argues that if others derive value from
manipulating the industry’s product, then the industry deserves
some of that value, although they did nothing to assist its creation.
219
220
221
222
223
224
225
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While the problem of the loss of value to the music industry
from the illegal copying and distribution of music should be
addressed, Gowers decided, after consultations with all the
stakeholders, and not just the music industry, that some exceptions
to the monopoly rights of copyright owners were needed,
particularly a private copying exception, because of the reality that
consumers believed that they could legitimately copy what they
already owned, and because the music industry had already derived
value from that sale.227 Gowers was concerned with protecting the
legitimacy of the law by promoting fairness and equity. The music
industry is clearly willing to continue the fight to protect and
extend their rights. Recent action by the European Commission
has shifted the debate to the European level.228
IV. THE EUROPEAN UNION POSITION ON COPYRIGHT TERM
EXTENSION
A. IViR Report
In November 2006, one month before the Gowers Review
came out, the Institute for Information Law at the University of
Amsterdam published its final, and much lengthier report entitled
The Recasting of Copyright & Related Rights for the Knowledge
Economy.229 This report had been commissioned by the European
Commission’s internal market directorate-general in 2005 as part
of an overall review of the fifteen years of harmonization of
copyright and related rights in Europe.230 The 300 page report
contained seven chapters, reviewing the consolidation of the
227

See GOWERS, supra note 7, at 63 (suggesting that rightholders could alter the pricing
scheme to include the cost of the right to copy in the sale price and allow for limited
private copying of the work).
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See Press Release, European Commission, Intellectual Property: Commission
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Package
(July
16,
2008),
available
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[hereinafter
Commission Adopts Forward-Looking Package] (announcing copyright initiatives to
align copyright term for performers with terms for authors and harmonize copyright term
that applies to co-written musical compositions).
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“acquis communautaire,” including one assessing the arguments
for and against extending the term of protection for related
rights.231
It started by noting that certain stakeholders—the report
identified phonogram producers—had, for some time, been calling
for such rights to be extended to align the rights of performers with
those of authors “in line with the highest international
standards.”232 The report noted that, by contrast, several groups,
mainly in the field of technology, had asked the Commission not to
proceed with any term extension as the term of protection was
already too long.233 Interestingly, film producers and broadcasting
organizations had also apparently made no claim for a term
extension.234 The European Commission Staff Working Paper on
the European copyright framework in 2004 had summarized the
policy consensus quite effectively by stating, “an extended term of
protection would only tend to diminish the choice of music on the
market by enforcing the flow of revenues from few best-selling
recordings, while at the same time not providing any real new
incentives for creation of new recordings or motivating new
investment.”235
In analyzing the arguments for and against any term extension
for sound recordings, the IViR had access to contributions
submitted by stakeholders to the earlier European Commission
working paper.236 It also held its own consultations with experts in
the field, and conducted an extensive evaluation of the legal and
economic literature.237 The Report produced for the Commission
was long, detailed and thorough.
Chapter three of the IViR report described in detail the terms of
protection currently enjoyed by various related rights at the
231
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international, European and national levels and evaluated all the
arguments its authors could find in favor of term extension,
dividing them into arguments “concerning the nature and
objectives of related rights . . . economic arguments, and . . .
arguments concerning the competition with non-E.U. market
players.”238 The Report split related rights into two categories,
(analyzing the rights of performers against phonogram producers,
film producers, and broadcasting organizations) stating that it
considered there to be different considerations and objectives for
performers as opposed to the other related rights holders.239 It also
contrasted the position of film producers (who as copyright owners
in Europe already enjoy significantly longer terms of protection),
with phonogram producers and broadcasting organizations, which
are currently protected under the fifty years term like
performers.240
1. The Nature and Objectives of Related Rights
Reviewing the legal history of the international recognition of
related rights, the Report noted that protection at the international
level for recordings was first achieved in 1961, with the adoption
of the Rome Convention.241
Phonogram producers and
broadcasting organizations gained protection under this
Convention on the grounds that they spent time, money and effort
on the production of phonograms and broadcasts.242 These rights
clearly had more in common with other types of industrial property
like design rights and the sui generis database right.243
As an industrial right, there was a good argument for
shortening rather than lengthening this protection to bring it into
line with the protection provided under E.U. law for other types of
industrial property such as databases and registered designs.244
238
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Gowers also suggested that the duration of the right for sound
recordings was already too long,245 but did not put the nature and
objective of these rights in their true place in European IP law as
economic rights, rather than personality-based rights like
copyright.
The IViR also considered the question of whether performers
merited protection on separate social grounds, that absent
protection they would be denied recompense for their creative
achievements, and others would benefit from the profits from their
fixed performances.246 It noted that, in Europe performers enjoyed
moral rights under most national legislation to protect their artistic
integrity,247 but that they had never been recognized as de jure
authors since there were important conceptual differences between
Most importantly, there is no
creators and performers.248
requirement of originality to protect a performance, as there is to
protect a work of authorship under copyright law.249 This places
performers in a different category of rights holders because they
gain protection for their endeavors simply by recording their work,
without having to achieve the higher bar of originality. This point
is one familiar in the civil law tradition, that performance is a
lesser economic right because it protects something less risky than
the creative activity involved in writing or composing.250
The Report conceded that performers may perhaps require
greater rights than the producers of sound recordings.251 However,
if the main reason for term extension is the laudable goal of
providing social security to performing artists in their later years,
then, in the view of the IViR authors, it was likely only to benefit a
very small percentage of performers still popular after fifty years,
and generally these were the performers least in need of that

245
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benefit.252 The IViR suggested that perhaps extending moral rights
protection for performers might be more justifiable and helpful
than extending their economic rights.253
The Report pointed out that, in reality, it is not performers’
intellectual property rights that need strengthening but their
contractual rights.254 Studies suggest that only the top performers
control their own performance rights.255 For most artists, whether
they will receive any benefit from the increase in term depends on
their contractual arrangements with the recording company.256 In
most cases the beneficiary of any increase in the term of
performers’ rights is likely to be the recording company.
As for the rights of phonogram producers, film producers and
broadcasting organizations, the main justification for their rights
was seen by the authors of the Report as economic; to protect and
serve as an incentive for investment.257 The IViR found that, given
the strong economic arguments advanced by rights holders in favor
of more protection, it was unfortunate that they had provided little
empirical evidence to substantiate their claims for a longer term.258
Although economic incentive arguments are usually given as the
main justification for extending related rights, there continues to be
little real evidence as to what extent any IP rights, and related
rights specifically, provide “incentives to promote innovat[ion],
creat[ion] and invest[ment] . . . .”259
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2. Economic Arguments
The Review considered the small amount of empirical evidence
provided by the music industry concerning the revenues they spend
on discovering and developing new talent.260 Since recordings
made before the late 1950’s, and therefore about to lose protection,
provided only three percent of record company income, and a
similar percentage of performers’ rights collected by collection
societies, extending the term of protection of such rights would, in
the view of the IViR authors, have no more than a limited impact
on the money available to invest in new music.261 The same
conclusion was reached by Gowers.262
In terms of recouping investment in particular sound
recordings, there was also a variety of evidence provided by the
music industry from which the Report’s authors adduced that
between 3,000–20,000 CDs had to be sold to produce a profit for
the average recording.263 The average Top 40 album in March
2006 sold 100,000 copies worldwide per week, but the vast
majority of recordings sold far fewer.264 However, music
recordings had short life cycles, typically selling mainly in the first
year or even months after release.265 Thus, reasoned the authors, if
a recording had not recouped its investment in the first fifty years
after release, it was extremely questionable whether an extension
of the term of protection would enable it to do so.266
The Report considered the “[i]mpacts of extending the term of
protection . . . on access, cultural diversity, and the effects of
digitisation” on music.267 Rights holders have argued that
extending their rights is likely to increase access to music by
encouraging them to exploit their back catalogs.268 Gowers had
found this argument unpersuasive on the basis of U.S. research
260
261
262
263
264
265
266
267
268

These estimates range from 2–17% of net revenues. Id. at 115.
Id. at 114–15.
See GOWERS, supra note 7, at 52.
IVIR REPORT, supra note 12, at 112.
See id. at 113.
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showing that more historic U.S. recordings were made available by
those without legal rights than by the rights holders.269 The IViR
Report noted that the exploitation of back catalogs is only valuable
for a small share of recordings that continues to generate
commercial value.270
Most recordings quickly became
unavailable. Extending the term of protection for many sound
recordings would simply ensure that this music remained locked
away from exposure to the public for longer, especially since rights
holders had no positive obligation to exploit their rights, and are
unlikely to do so if they perceived no immediate commercial
gain.271 Allowing such material into the public domain might
actually be preferable from a public welfare perspective, as it could
be exploited by others, whether other commercial organizations or
non-profit, or educational groups.272
The Report noted that digitization offered new opportunities to
remarket and distribute back catalogs in new distribution formats
but that this technology had not always been embraced by the
music industry. Rights holders have now proposed, according to
the IViR, that a longer term of protection would create an incentive
for them to digitize their back catalogs and benefit from the socalled “long tail effect” of the many sound recordings that sell in
small numbers, in contrast to the small number of high-selling,
mass-appeal recordings.273 An online store unconstrained by space
can stock and exploit many more niche recordings and low sellers
than a brick-and-mortar store, and the “long tail effect” means that
it can make money from them even with low individual sales
volumes.274 Of course, the possibilities of digitization have been
with us for a few years, and various business models have been
embraced by technology companies to capture value from
digitization.275

269
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See GOWERS, supra note 7, at 54.
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The IViR contended that it was questionable that an extension
of the term of sound recordings would be likely to induce the
recording industry to make use of new digital business models
since they have so far been loath to do so.276 The authors also
questioned whether related rights protection would be the best
means for creating incentives to explore this potential.277
The music industry, of course, sees this differently, contending
that they have been left out of this new value creation.278 Their
response to the U.K. IPO consultation described Sony’s
commercially unsuccessful experience of providing customers
access to digitized music that could only be played on a Sony
device.279 It apparently took Sony four years to listen that
customers wanted portable music.280 Sony (and the rest of the
music industry) did not appear to learn from this experience the
lesson that a successful business must adapt its business strategy to
provide what the customer wants. Rather, the point made by the
Music Business Group was that the customer was taking value
from the business.281 The proposal in the Music Business Group
report is for a digital business model which would enable the
industry to generate income by imposing a levy for format shifting
music that the customer already owns in another format.282 This
would certainly create value for the industry by enabling
companies to sell something they have already sold. The IViR
report is right to be skeptical of whether the music industry will
suddenly embrace new business ideas simply because related rights
receive a longer term of protection.

276

See id.
Id. (“It is questionable whether protection of sound recordings beyond 50 years
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The IViR Report decided, on balance, that extending the term
of related rights would hurt, rather than help, the diversity of
European music, especially given that 81% of the European market
is dominated by four global labels which already have significant
control over exploitation and distribution of music within
Europe.283 This concentration within the industry goes some way
to explaining the music industries’ lobbying power, as well as
providing a significant reason why politicians should be cautious
about changing the law to benefit the industry without clear
evidence of benefit to the rest of society. If a group lobbies for a
change to the law, they should, at the least, be required to show
that any change to the status quo provides a benefit, to those other
than themselves and preferably to society as a whole. The increase
in term for sound recordings and performers’ rights clearly
provides a windfall to recording companies but appears unlikely to
benefit anyone else.
According to the IViR, the cost increases created by the related
rights monopolies only serve a useful function if they are an
“unavoidable consequen[ce] of an incentive system for which there
is no better alternative.”284 The extension of the term beyond fifty
years would increase deadweight costs and thus be detrimental to
the public domain.285 There would likely be higher licensing costs
to pay for the secondary use of sound recordings in every area
from podcasts to play in restaurants. Tracing costs to find the
rights owners of older recordings would also likely increase,
especially as there is no central database for such rights in
Europe.286 Sound recording prices would likely remain higher for
consumers.287 It is clear that the main beneficiaries in all this
would be the recording companies. Performing artists might not
even benefit greatly from any increased term of protection, since
although they might receive remuneration from collecting societies
283

See IVIR REPORT, supra note 12, at 118.
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285
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See, e.g., Wikibooks—UK Database Law: Existence, http://en.wikibooks.org/wiki/
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for the longer period (assuming, of course, their music remained
popular), they have often contracted away their exclusive rights in
their performances and sound recordings to recording companies,
who would thus be the main beneficiaries of any term increase.288
3. Competition with Non-E.U. Players
The IViR Report dealt with the argument that the term of
protection in Europe put European rights holders at a competitive
disadvantage with rights holders in non-E.U. countries by stating
that the only country with significantly longer protection for
related rights—the U.S.—does not apply a “comparison of terms”
so Europeans receive the same legal protection as Americans in the
U.S. market.289 The music industry had suggested that the
European music industry might become less profitable because the
longer term of protection in the U.S. might cause European
producers to make recordings specifically to sell in the U.S. rather
than Europe, to the detriment of European diversity and culture.290
The music industry also argued that if sound recording rights were
extended in Europe, then European record companies could
increase the value of the intangible assets recorded in their balance
sheets.291
The IViR debunked these arguments. The authors considered
that it was questionable whether the term of protection would
directly affect the international competitiveness of the recording
industry on a large scale given the many other factors affecting its
competitiveness, such as, importantly, the ability to use new
distribution channels.292 Given that the share of the domestic
market in the U.S. provided by domestic music was 93% (much
higher than the domestic share of the music market in most
European countries) the Report concluded that there was no
evidence to suggest that there was a large market for European
music in the U.S., or that music companies were trying to develop
288
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it, in fact, the opposite, since it was clear that most music was sold
in its own national market.293 There was also no good evidence
that music companies would benefit in accounting terms from an
increased duration of sound recording rights, given that most did
not include the value of their own catalogs as intangible assets in
their balance sheets at all, and amortized any externally acquired
music catalogs within twenty years, strongly suggesting that the
true position of recouping investment in music is that it is done
within the first few years of release, or not at all.294
The IViR reiterated what the music industry has been careful to
avoid mentioning, which is that “from an international perspective,
American terms are anomalous and cannot serve as a justification,
from a legal perspective, for extending the terms of related rights
in the E.U.”295 The Report concluded that there were no good
legal, economic or comparative arguments for extending the term
of related rights and, like the Gowers Review, recommended
against it.296
B. E.U. Commission Proposal
Approximately one year after the IViR and Gowers had
published their thorough reviews of the question of extension of
the term of protection for sound recordings, on February 14, 2008,
the E.U. Commissioner for Internal Market and Services, Charlie
McCreevy, proposed that the term of copyright protection for
European performers should be extended to ninety-five years in
Europe.297 In doing so, the Commissioner ignored the evidence of
the Gowers Review,298 the E.U. commissioned IViR report299 and
the Commission’s own staff working paper on the European
copyright framework.300 The Commission proposal has been
strongly supported by French president Nicholas Sarkozy, a big fan
293
294
295
296
297
298
299
300

See id.
See id. at 131.
Id. at 132.
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of sixties pop, and friend of Johnny Hallyday, one of France’s
best-known rock stars.301 Mr. Sarkozy indicated that he would
make copyright extension a priority of France’s six-month turn at
the European Union presidency, which started in July 2008.302
The reason for the proposed change to European law,
according to Commissioner McCreevy is the disparity between the
copyright protection afforded the composer, and the protection
afforded the performer; “[it] is the performer who gives life to the
composition and while most of us have no idea who wrote our
favourite song—we can usually name the performer.”303
According to the press release of the announcement, Mr.
McCreevy was particularly concerned about royalties for
anonymous session musicians, rather than those for big-name
featured artists.304 Mr. McCreevy stated that, because many
musicians start recording in their twenties, royalty income stops
when they are in the most vulnerable period of their lives
(retirement) and since life expectancy in the E.U. (seventy-five for
men and eighty-one for women) means performers are living
longer, they need their performers’ rights income to continue into
retirement.305
This argument conveniently ignores the issue noted by both
Gowers and IViR that only a minority of musicians remain
sufficiently popular to even earn royalties for the current fifty-year
term, let alone seventy years or ninety-five years,306 and in any
case,
most
performers—especially
anonymous
session
musicians—have often signed away any rights in their recordings
or performances to record companies.307 Thus, as a retirement
program for musicians, extending the duration of performers’
rights, would be ineffective for all but the most successful
performers, who probably do not require it.
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The difference between the rights of performers and composers
is also discussed in the Gowers Review and the IViR Report. In
the IViR Report it is noted that there are significant conceptual
differences between the two types of actors. Composers are
treated as creators by European law, because they assume more
risk,308 while performers, having no requirement to create original
materials, have more in common with the owners of other
industrial property rights.309
Gowers noted that the whole copyright bargain was about
fairness, and the fairness most ignored was that of the bargain
between the public, and creators and performers.310 Gowers also
pointed out that performers were very unlikely, because of
contractual arrangements with recording companies, to see much
benefit from any term increase.311
Both Gowers and the IViR Report concluded from this that the
rights accorded to performers are probably already too long rather
than too short.312 It should be noted that performers also have the
opportunity to exploit their celebrity status in other ways generally
unavailable to composers (who, tellingly, as McCreevy pointed
out, are often unknown to the general public).313
McCreevy also advanced the music industry argument that the
shorter term for performers’ rights limited the recording
companies’ ability to reap the benefits of their original investment
in the recording,314 a position which is contradicted by almost
everyone who has considered it outside the music industry,315 but
which was raised once again by the music industry in their
308

See Towse, supra note 30, at 748.
IVIR REPORT, supra note 12, at 133, 134.
310
See GOWERS, supra note 7, at 50 (“But the fairness argument applies to society as a
whole. Copyright can be viewed as a ‘contract’ between rights owners and society for
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See id. at 50–51.
312
See id. at 50 (“Economic evidence indicates that the length of protection for
copyright works already far exceeds the incentives required to invest in new works.”);
IVIR REPORT, supra note 12, at 101 (“[T]he existing terms of protection of related rights
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response to Taking Forward, the U.K. government consultation on
the Gowers’ recommendations.316 McCreevy also, of course,
mentioned that changing the law would bring European law in line
with U.S. law,317 without mentioning the important point that the
U.S. law in question provided a term of protection which was
anomalous internationally.318
Commissioner McCreevy dealt in his announcement with the
familiar counterargument for consumers—that the proposed
change to the law would increase prices. He said that studies
showed that the price of sound recordings out of copyright “[wa]s
not lower than [those] in copyright.”319 The “studies” from which
he derived this evidence were not made public, but the likely
candidate is the Price Waterhouse Coopers study commissioned for
the British Music Industry in order to respond to the Gowers
Review.320 This could hardly be called an independent study.
While apparently finding no price differential between music out
of copyright and that still protected, even Price Waterhouse
Coopers cautioned that there were not many recordings in the
public domain on which to base its findings.321
In several more clearly independent studies, researchers have
found what would be expected, namely that the price of
copyrighted works drops once copyright protection has expired.322
316

See U.K. INTELLECTUAL PROP. OFFICE FOR CREATIVITY & INNOVATION, TAKING
FORWARD THE GOWERS REVIEW OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 60, available at
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supported by recording companies.”).
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Term Extension Frequently Asked Questions (July 16, 2008), available at
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/08/508
[hereinafter
Commission Proposal on a Directive] (citing PRICE WATERHOUSE, THE IMPACT OF
COPYRIGHT EXTENSION FOR SOUND RECORDINGS IN THE UK (2006)).
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322
See, e.g., Paul Heald, Property Rights and the Efficient Exploitation of Copyrighted
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Gowers and the IViR Report both referred to studies showing that
prices tended to decrease once copyright protection expired.323
The French apparently believe that support for an extension is
rising in Europe and that, during their six month presidency of the
European Union, they would be able to overcome British and
German reluctance to extending the term of copyright.324 On July
16, 2008, shortly after the beginning of the French Presidency, and
to the delight of older European musicians, the Commision started
the process of consultation on changing the law by releasing its
proposal to “align the copyright term for performers with that
applicable to authors.”325 The proposal envisaged extending the
term of protection from fifty to ninety-five years, although the
extension would contain a use it or lose it provision so that rights
would only be extended for work commercially released.326
Commissioner McCreevy committed himself to ensuring
performers maintained “a decent income and that there w[ould] be
a European-based music industry in the years to come.”327
C. Reaction to the Commission Proposal in Europe
Reaction to the Commission proposal from the British
government, European academics and even some musicians, was
swift. In a press release two days after the proposal was
announced, U.K. government Minister of Intellectual Property,
Baroness Delyth Morgan said: “Because copyright represents a
monopoly we need to be very clear that the circumstances justify
an extension. We will therefore need to consider these proposals

323
See GOWERS, supra note 7, at 55 fig. 4.4; IVIR REPORT, supra note 12, at 113 (citing
Stan J. Liebowitz, What are the Consequences of the European Union Extending
Copyright Length For Sound Recordings? (Feb. 2006) (unpublished study), available at
http://www.ifpi.org/content/library/liebowitz-study-aug2007.pdf).
324
See Bremner, supra note 2.
325
See Commission Adopts Forward-Looking Package, supra note 228.
326
See Commission Proposal on a Directive, supra note 320; see also Dave Rowntree,
EU Strikes the Wrong Note on Copyright, DAILY TELEGRAPH, July 17, 2008, available at
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/opinion/main.jhtml?xml=/opinion/2008/07/17/do1707.xml.
327
Commission Adopts Forward-Looking Package, supra note 228.
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carefully to understand how they would work and what the benefits
are likely to be.”328
A change in the E.U. law harmonizing copyright and related
right protection across Europe will necessitate a change in U.K.
law even though current U.K. government policy opposes an
extension. The U.K. IPO had been seeking input from all
stakeholders on the private copying extension recommended by
Gowers.329 Once the European proposal was made public, the IPO
extended its deadline for consultation to allow for any comments
on the E.U. proposal, reiterating that evidence from Gowers and
other sources suggested that extending the term of protection
would hurt both consumers and industry.330
In June 2008, fifty leading European copyright academics
produced a more detailed critique of the Commission proposal
described in Commissioner McCreevy’s February press release.331
They sent their statement to the Commission on July 16, 2008, in
order, they said, to assist in “rational policy making.”332
Unfortunately, it arrived too late to have an effect on the
Commission’s decision making since the Commission announced
the process of consultation to amend E.U. law that same day.333
The Bournemouth University statement unequivocally
recommended against any term extension. It reviewed all the
available empirical data on the four main arguments it identified in
favor of term extension: These were the usual economic and
comparative arguments favored by the music industry, namely that
older artists would benefit from it, that it would result in more
sound recordings being made available to the public, that price
would be unaffected, and that it would remove harmful trade
328

Press Release, U.K. IPO, UK-IPO Response to the European Commission’s
Proposal to Extend the Term of Copyright Protection (July 18, 2008), available at
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disparities between the European and U.S. markets.334 For each of
these arguments and citing academic studies, the Gowers Review
and submissions to it, as well as the European Commission’s own
staff working paper, the academics found the evidence was clearly
against the music industry.335
On the claim that Commissioner McCreevy made about term
extension assisting older artists in their declining years, the
academics pointed to evidence that “artists’ earnings are primarily
a matter of contract, not copyright.”336 Extending the term of
related rights protection would simply provide a windfall for
record companies, while providing little or no benefit to artists,
who have often contracted their rights to their recording company
in return for a lump sum payment.337
Concerning the supply of new music, the Bournemouth
academics findings were that, “[a]ny serious empirical work that
has been done on this issue, points in the direction of common
sense.” That is, musical compositions were more likely to be
exploited once they were in the public domain, and a vibrant public
domain helped, not hindered creativity.338 For example, one study
they cited found that music in the public domain was more often
used in films than protected music.339
On the price issue, the academics noted that it was
“preposterous” for recording companies to simultaneously claim
that they needed term extension to boost revenue while arguing
that it would have no effect on price, and they urged the
Commission to seek “robust evidence” on this subject.340
The Bournemouth academics pointed out that the trade
argument made by the music industries was really two arguments.
The first was essentially that American artists had the comparative
advantage of a better regulatory environment due to longer terms

334
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of copyright protection.341 The second was the unrelated balance
of payment issue and the suggestion that, because of the longer
term, European copyright owners were remitting money to
America.342 The academics believed that the shorter term in
Europe actually benefited Europeans in terms of creativity, “[i]n
terms of comparative advantage, the shorter term gives Europe an
edge in innovation.”343 Also, since the U.S. provided reciprocity,
commercial conditions were equal for players on both sides of the
Atlantic.344
On the balance of payment issue the academics pointed out that
given that four large multinationals with opaque accounting
techniques controlled over 70% of global music,345 it was difficult,
if not impossible, to determine whether additional revenues would
flow to or from Europe. Consequently, they suggested that the
effects of a term reduction for related rights needed to be as
thoroughly investigated by the Commission as the effects of a
proposed extension, before making policy based on this
argument.346
Only a few days after the Commission proposal was made
public a group of some of the same copyright scholars who had
drafted the Bournemouth Statement, published a letter in The
Times proclaiming, “Copyright extension is the enemy of
innovation.”347 In their letter they pointed out that the Commission
proposal would prevent culturally important sound recordings from
the 1950s and 60s from entering the public domain for another
forty-five years, while benefiting no one other than large music
companies.348 They also stressed that the proposal was counter to
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all independent external expertise on this issue, including the IViR
Report, which was a study conducted for the Commission itself.349
In addition to academics from across Europe, even some
musicians made known their opposition to the Commission’s
proposal. Writing in the British paper, The Daily Telegraph, Dave
Rowntree, drummer with Blur, argued that the Commission
proposal was a mistake that could have disastrous consequences
for “access to our recorded heritage” and that confusing copyright
law with contracts and pensions was not a good idea.350 It was
simply not true that any increased earnings would keep “starving
artists” from poverty.351 In common with others in this debate, he
marveled that the Commission had apparently simply ignored all
the analysis done by Gowers and the other independent reviewers
and had “[thrown] out the economic evidence.”352
Unfortunately, once again none of these arguments appear to
have been heard in Europe. On February 12, 2009 the Legal
Affairs Committee of the European Parliament approved the
Commission proposal to amend the European Copyright Directive
to increase the term of protection for sound recordings to ninetyfive years.353 In what might be interpreted as a sop to the many
critics who have argued that any extension will primarily provide a
windfall financial benefit recording companies and not performers,
the press release of the proceedings notes that the committee
introduced two additions to the original directive: a clause
preventing music recording companies from using previous
contractual agreements to deduct money from any additional
royalties due to performers under the extension; and provision for a
dedicated fund for session musicians to be paid for by recording
companies out of “revenues gained from the proposed extension of
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copyright term.”354 The proposed legislation is scheduled to be
voted on by the European Parliament in March 2009, and must also
be separately approved by the Council of Europe.355
V. LIKELY DEVELOPMENT OF LAW ON RELATED RIGHTS IN EUROPE
AND THE GLOBAL DEBATE
As so many including Rowntree have pointed out, the
European Commission proposal adopted by the Legal Affairs
Committee ignores all the available evidence on the topic of term
extension.356 The Gowers Review and the IViR Report both
provided detailed analyses of the effect on all stakeholders, not
simply the music industry, of extending the term of protection for
sound recordings. These reports both found that the only goal
likely to be served by increasing the term of protection for sound
recordings was an increase in profits for recording companies.
They both also concluded that the other arguments used to justify
an extension by the music industry, namely that it would provide
money in royalties for older artists, that it would not increase
prices, and that it was necessary to harmonize E.U. law with U.S.
law, did not stand up to scrutiny. Both studies found that the
consequences of a change to the law were more likely to be that
music became more expensive and less available, thus decreasing
opportunities for creativity and innovation by the next generation
of musical talent.
It is hard to believe that any stakeholders other than the
recording companies, and, perhaps, a few select, successful older
musicians will see a benefit from the proposed change to European
law. However, in the face of similar discontent in 1998, U.S. law
was amended, ostensibly to bring it into line with European law.357
Unfortunately, it is hard to think of an instance in the recent
history of copyright and related rights protection where the public
domain has triumphed over the interests of rights holders. The
354
355
356
357
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See Rowntree, supra note 326; see also Kreschmer et al., supra note 331, at 1.
See Patry, supra note 48, at 930.
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content industries have far greater lobbying power than those
defending the public domain, and across the globe legislation has
steadily increased protection for rights holders at the expense of
the public domain.358 Along the way there have been a few
challenges, generally unsuccessful, to extensions of the law,359 but
under both treaties, and national laws rights have steadily been
increased and extended.360
The European Commissioner argues that the proposal to extend
the term of related rights in Europe is to ensure Europe’s place in
the “knowledge economy” by encouraging creativity.361 However,
creativity and innovation in Europe, and elsewhere, is far more
likely to be encouraged by expanding the public domain so that
artists can reinterpret and borrow themes without fear of litigation
by rights holders. Innovation is less likely to come from increasing
intellectual property rights, although this will increase the profits
of current rights holders.
The globalization and digitization of the world economy have
changed the economics of creativity, and some industries have
been better than others at determining how to derive value from
their product when new technologies allow it to be copied
perfectly, many times over, and at minimal cost. So far, in the
copyright sphere it has not been those who control copyrights and
related rights, like recording companies, who have created new
opportunities for exploiting their products in the digital economy.
Successful services like iTunes, and applications that enable music
to be played on cell phones or social networking sites, have been
created by technology companies.362
358

See Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998, Pub. L. No.105-298, 112 Stat. 2827.
See, e.g., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (unsuccessful challenge to the
Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998, which extended the U.S. copyright term to life of
the author plus seventy years or ninety-five years for works made for hire).
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See, e.g., TRIPs Agreement, supra note 34 (substantially increasing minimum term
of protection available to fifty years).
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See Commission Adopts Forward-Looking Package, supra note 228.
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Charles Haddad, Apple’s iTunes: Best of Show: The New Digital-Music Player, Part
of a Plan to Make the Mac an Entertainment Hub, is Easier to Use Than its Many
Competitors, BUS. WK., Jan. 24, 2001, available at http://www.businessweek.com/
bwdaily/dnflash/jan2001/nf20010124_897.htm (noting that iTunes was developed by Jeff
Robbin, who was hired away from Casady and Greene to develop iTunes for Apple).
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The music industry is arguing for extension to its already long,
existing rights because it has not, so far, found a successful
alternative business model in this new economy and wants to
derive as much value as possible from its existing, failing, business
model. It has been successful in courts and legislatures in the U.S.
in obtaining greater rights and has now concentrated its attention
on extending the term of related rights protection in Europe.
The European Commission and Parliament are in a real
position to halt the record company’s lobbyists continued,
unwarranted, diminution of the public domain, and influence the
global debate about the optimum strength of copyright and related
rights protection in the new economy. Unfortunately the current
E.U. strategy appears to be to carry out the music industry’s
bidding and increasing the term of protection without regard to the
evidence. There are two major independent analyses at European
lawmakers’ disposal, both of which clearly find that term extension
is likely to harm rather than help Europe’s position as a center of
innovation in the global economy.
The European Union has the power to send a message to the
music industry lobby that it has more than sufficient legal
protection in Europe and that policymakers in Europe understand
that the real innovation in the digital and global economy will
come, not from outdated models like that of the record companies,
but from new models which embrace the new possibilities for
recording and distributing music, and are already being developed
by the technology sector. These industries are not served by, and
have not sought or supported an extension of the term of related
rights.363 It is hard to decrease legal protections but it is clear from
all independent analyses on this topic that the music industry
already has a greater degree of protection than is warranted by the
evidence. The E.U. should consider very carefully before
providing yet greater rights.
The Gowers Review, the IViR, the comprehensive U.K. IPO
consultation on the Gowers Review recommendations, and the
European Commission proposal all considered carefully the
available evidence on term extension. The reports included
363
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significant analysis, based on review of the research and extensive
consultations with many stakeholders, and each report clearly
concluded that content owners and distributors such as recording
companies currently enjoyed rights that were already far more
extensive than necessary to encourage creativity. The music
industries’ arguments in favor of even greater rights were weak
and inconsistent, and debunked in each successive independent
report.
Every serious consideration of the issues found that the price of
music would be likely to increase, consumer choice would be
likely to diminish, and little, if any, extra money would be
provided to artists whose rights were generally more a matter of
contract rather than intellectual property law. In fact, it is agreed
by almost all commentators outside the music industry that the
main beneficiaries of any change in the law in Europe would be
music recording companies.
Despite the evidence, the E.U. has proposed extending the term
of protection from fifty to ninety-five years. Any change to the
legal system should only be effected if there is significant benefit
to the public. Intellectual property laws are intended to provide a
balance between the interests of the public and rights owners.
Extending the term of protection for related rights to ninety-five
years is tantamount to providing for a perpetual copyright term,
and essentially eliminates all balance in favor of the interests of
rights holders. It is to be hoped that the E.U. Commission and
Parliament will review the evidence once again and listen to
feedback on its proposal from those outside the music industry
before approving any changes to E.U. law.
CONCLUSION
The E.U. currently has an historic chance to acknowledge that
copyright and related-right owners have been extremely successful
lobbyists, and have been granted rights over the last few decades
far beyond those necessary to foster creativity, skewing the
balancing act that copyright law is supposed to perform, clearly
away from the public domain. These extensive rights are likely to
eventually become a disservice even to rights holders because such
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strong rights will tend to slow innovation and restrict creativity,
something likely to be particularly important in the digital age. A
refusal to further expand its IP rights might even cause the music
industry to change its increasingly outdated business model, and
find new ways to encourage innovation in music and the arts.

